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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
SUITS BY INFANTS - PROCEDURE - DISMISSAL WHERE
SUIT Is "NOT FOR THE BENEFIT" OF INFANT.
Plaintiff, a 17-year-old boy, was struck on the face by the de-
fendant, one of his high school teachers, and plaintiff brought an
action by his mother as next friend alleging an assault and battery
upon P. Defendant moved to dismiss the action. On the hearing
the plaintiff testified that he wanted the action stopped. The court
of appeals held that under section 11247 of the Ohio General Code,,
the defendant could move the court to dismiss the action because it
was not brought for the benefit of the infant. The court further held
that, in view of the plaintiff's testimony and the fact that only nomi-
nal damages could have been recovered, the- lower court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the action. Judge Lloyd, in dis-
senting, said the court's power in advance of trial was limited to
the question of whether or not the next friend was a fit and proper
person.-
Several states3 have enacted statutes similar to the one in Ohio,
but none of these has been construed by the courts. The court in
the Hanna case said, in effect, that the action of the legislature in
enacting Section I1247 was to codify the rules of the common law.
It is well then to examine the common law in the light of the de-
cision of the court.
It has been held that anyone with legal capacity to sue could
act as next friend for an infant and no permission of the court was
necessary to bring an action. 4 The usual practice, however, is to
recognize the one rightfully entitled to act as next friend, the nearest
relative of the infant. 5 But in the absence of a special statute the
'The action of an insane person must be brought by his guardian; and of an infant
by his guardian or next friend. When the action is brought by his next friend, the court
may dismiss it, if it is not for the benefit of the infant, or substitute the guardian, or
any person, as next friend.
2 Hanna v. Titus, 68 Ohio App. 127, 39 N. E. (2d) 556 (1941).
3Indiana (1926), Sees. 263-266, 378; Iowa (1858), Secs. 10965; Arkansas (1937),
Sec. 1327; New Mexico (1929), Sees. 105-102; Kansas (1935), Sees. 60-406; Okahoma,
Title 12, Sec. 226.
4 Heck v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 281 Pa. 595, 127 A. S18 (1925); Barwick
v. Reckley, 45 Ala. 215 (1871); Walker v. Else, 7 Sim. 234, 4 L. J. Ch. 54, 8 Eng. Ch.
234, 58 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 826 (18M).
Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128, 8 L. ed. 890 (1834); Stereus v. Cole.,
7 Cush. 467 (Mass. 1851); Chicago Screw Co. v. Weiss, 203 II. 536, 68 N. E. 54 (1903).
See OHio G. C. Sec. 10507-8.
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validity of the appointment is not affected.6 In England, the father
as natural guardian of the infant has a vested interest and should be
substituted in place of another who has procured the appointment by
the court as next friend.
7
The infant is the real party in interest and the action must be
brought in his name and not in the name of the next friend. The
relationship of the next friend and the infant is similar to that of an
attorney and client " in that the next friend is considered an officer
of the court subject to the control and supervision of the court.10
Where the next friend is not a proper person or he is not acting for
the best interests of the infant he may be removed and another sub-
stituted in his place.' 1
Thus, where the next friend has an interest in the suit adverse
to or conflicting with that of the infant he may be removed and an-
other substituted in his stead.' 2  Likewise, the next friend may be
removed where his views on the merits of the litigation are opposed
to the interests of the infant,'3 or when he is incompetent 14 or guilty
of misconduct.'
While several cases have stated, at least in dicta, that an action
may be dismissed where it is not for the benefit of the infant,16 two
cases only have been found where the suits were actually dismissed
for this reason on the motion of the defendant.' 7  In another case
the proceedings were postponed where the action was started with-
c Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128, 8 Ld ed. 890 (1834).
7 Woolf v. Pemberton, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 19 (1877).
Morgan v. Potter, 157 U. S. 195, 39 L. ed. 670, 15 S. Ct. 590 (1895); St. Louis
I. M. &- S. R. Co. v. Haist, 71 Ark. 25S. 72 S. IV. 893, 100 Am. St. Rep. 85 (1908);
Zaritzky v. Prudential Insurance Co., 14 N. J. Miscl. Rep. 527, 186 At. 42 (1936).
Bartinelli v. Galoni, 331 Pa. 73, 200 AtI. 58, 118 A. L. R. 398 (1938).
"'Garner v. I. E. Schilling Co., 128 Fla. 353, 174 So. 837, 111 A. L. R. 682 (1937);
McCarrick v. Kealy, 70 Conn. 642, 40 Ad. 603 (1898).
u Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 30 L. ed. 1047, 10 S. Ct. 638 (1890);
Apthrop v. Backus, Kirby (Conn.) 407, 1 Am. Dec. 26 (1788); Tripp v. Gifford, 155
Mass. 108, 29 N. E. 208, 31 Am. St. Rep. 53 (1891).
'" Patterson v. Pullman, 104 Ill. 80 (1882); Dickson v. Jordan, 210 Ala. 602, 98 So.
&6 (1924) (mother acting as next friend and individually in action to sell lands of
deased husband and father); Bicknell v. Bicknell, 111 Mass. 265 (1873) (suit by
father to recover money loaned to the infants by the stepmother); Swope v. Swope, 173
Ala. 157, 55 So. 418, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 937 (1911).
13 In re Jaeger, 218 Wis. 1, 259 N. W. 842 (1935) (case of a guardian ad litem who
filed a brief supporting the side opposing the infant).
"Tate v. !Sott, 96 N. C. 19, 2 S. E. 176 (1887).
t Apthrop v. Backus, Kirby (Conn.) 407, 1 Am. Dec. 26 (1788).
'
0 Roberts v. Vaughn, 142 Tenn. 361, 219 S. W. 1034, 9 A. L. R. 1528 (1919); Swope
v. Swore, 173 Ala. 157, 55 So. 418, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 937 (1911).
17 Sale v. Sale, 1 Beav. 556, 48 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 1068 (18&9); Walker v. Else,
7 Sim. 234, 4 L. J. Ch. 54, 8 Eng. Ch. 234, 58 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 826 (1835).
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out the knowledge of the plaintiff, a 2o-year-old girl, because in the
opinion of the court it was for her benefit to wait until she reached
majority.'
Of the two cases which dismissed the action on the motion of the
defendant, the court in the first case dismissed the suit for the reason
that the motive of the next friend in bringing the action was to de-
fraud the infant plaintiff.'8 In the second case a discharged em-
ployee of the defendant and unrelated to the infant brought an action
to spite the defendant rather than for the benefit of the infant
plaintiff.20
The obvious purpose of the Ohio statute is to protect the in-
terests of the infant. Yet, there appears to be an added reason for
its enactment and that is to prevent a fraud upon the court itself.
The English case above, where the purpose of the next friend in
bringing the action was to defraud the infant, is an example of this.
From the Court's interpretation of the statute two alternatives are
open to the court when the action is not for the benefit of the infant.
That alternative should be followed which will best protect the infant
whether it means the removal of the next friend and the appointment
of another or the dismissal of the litigation. Where the purpose of
the next friend, for example, is to defraud the infant, it seems that
the only means of guarding the infant's rights is to dismiss the suit.
Given a clear case, the court should exercise its power and dismiss
the action or remove the next friend regardless of the manner in
which the matter was brought to its attention, and regardless of
what stage has been reached in the proceedings.
The remaining question then is whether or not the court abused
its discretion in the instant case.
The point of disagreement between the majority and dissenting
opinions was reached when the majority was willing to look at the
merits of the case to determine whether or not there was a benefit
to the plaintiff. None of the cases reviewed in this note has gone
so far. The question in those cases seemed to be limited to whether
or not the next friend was a proper person and was acting in the
best interest of the infant.
Subject to the supervisory control of the court, the next friend
18 Guild v. Cranston, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 506 (1851).
10 Sale v. Sale, 1 Beav. 586, 48 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 1069 (1939).
20 Walker v. Else, 7 Sim. 234, 5 L. J. Ch. 54, 8 Eng. Ch. 234, 58 Eng. Rep. (Reprint)
826 (1835).
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has free power to act to secure the infant's rights.2' The purpose of
the next friend is to supply the want of capacity in the minor and to
supply someone legally responsible for the costs. 22 One case, at least,
has said that it is the next friend and not the infant who decides upon
the policy to bring suit.
23
Nothing appears in the principal case to indicate that the mother
as next friend was not acting in her judgment for the best interests
of the plaintiff. If the infant has not the capacity to bring an action
in the first place, his opinion or judgment that the suit should be ter-
minated should not be grounds for dismissal of the action.
The statute gives control to the court over the next friend be-
cause the Court does not appoint the next friend in the first instance.
But, where a proper person is acting in the interest of the infant,
the statute does not contemplate that the court shall substitute its
judgment for that of a jury in determining the merits of the litigation.
It is unfair to infants as a class to give a defendant this added de-
fense which he would not have had if the plaintiff had been a person
of legal age.
S. L. W.
Equity
BALANCING THE INCONVENIENCES IN TRESPASS AND
NUISANCES CASES IN OHIO.
The court of equity is a court of discretion. A doctrine vhich
is sometimes used to guide that discretion is the principle of bal-
ancing the equities or balancing the inconveniences. Its purpose is
to avoid the issuance of injunctions which would operate oppressively,
or inequitably, or contrary to the justice of the case. Thus, a plain-
tiff who is suffering irreparable damages, who has no adequate rem-
edy at law, and whose right to an injunction is clear, may, neverthe-
less, be denied injunctive relief, if equity, after balancing the
inconveniences, finds the equities of the case with the defendant.
SRoberts v. Vaughn, 142 Term. 361, 219 S. W. 1034, 9 A. L. R1. 1528 (1919); Re
Moore, 269 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 004, 28 S. Ct. &Q5, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164 (1908). (Next
friend may select the tribunal.)
"Bertinelli v. Galoni, 331 Pa. 73, 200 Ad. 58, 118 A. L. R. 398 (1938); See Ouro
G. C. 11248.
3 Swope v. Swope, 173 Ala. 157, 55 So. 418, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 937 (1911).
